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I. The Problem 
The disagreement between pro- and anti-vivisectionists 
has a long history.! While the "debate" has taken varied 
forms over the last 150 years, some features of it have 
not changed much. One lingering feature is the 
intransigence among the proponents of each side to 
yield any considerations to their opponents. This 
intransigence might appear to represent a stalemate were 
it not for the fact that very little conversation between 
opposing parties has actually taken place, partly I 
suspect, because those who are most vocal in the debate 
do not share a common forum. Conciliators who have 
aspired to develop such fora have had limited success 
in the past, and scholarly speculation about the prospects 
for reconciliation range from "irreconcilable values" 
to "convergence" to "imminent consensus." (Ritvo, 
1984, Moss, 1984) In a recent article, Gary Varner 
(1994) adds to the optimism voiced by Arthur Caplan 
in 1983 (Ritvo, 1984: 63, PRIM&R, 1983) that the two 
sides are really not so far apart that dialogue could not 
bring them together. 
Varner argues that, in terms of moral theorizing, 
only empirical questions keep the opponents apart-
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namely the question about the connection between 
research and its alleged beneficial consequences. This, 
of course, is no small gap to be easily leapt over. 
Singer's criticism of the biomedical research 
establishment (1990) is pretty radical, and the issues 
dividing those who agree with Singer from those who 
support the system as it now exists are a lot deeper 
than whether it is acceptable to use nonhuman animals 
invasively in research. So, even if Varner is correct 
about the moral theorizing, I don't think Varner's 
optimism is warranted. But I do find the basis for 
Varner's optimism thought-provoking, namely his 
claim that pro- and anti-vivisectionists share a 
commitment to the same, or at least similar moral 
foundations. In fact, I think Varner is more correct in 
this assessment than even he realizes, but for different 
reasons than the ones that he gives. 
Varner thinks that pro-vivisectionists are "Tom 
Regan rights theorists" in their attitudes towards fellow 
humans, but "Peter Singer utilitarians" in their attitudes 
towards nonhuman animals. I take this to mean "in their 
attitudes towards using humans and using nonhuman 
animals as research subjects." I think this claim, to be 
accurate, requires a lot of qualification,2 but I do not 
intend to focus on that issue in what follows. What I do 
want to do is to look at the moral philosophies ofSinger 
and Regan in another light: whether they provide any 
usable foundations for constructing what some 
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philosophers have referred to as "a middle position 
about the ethics of using animals in research."3 
The idea of developing a middle position is 
historically situated in the outcomes of two pieces of 
Federal legislation enacted in 1985, the Health 
Extension Authorization Act and the 1985 Amendment 
to the Animal Welfare Act. Both require that research 
facilities regulate their use of animals by in-house 
animal care and use committees.4 These committees 
must include in their membership 
a. a veterinarian, 
b. some person not affiliated with the institution, and 
c. a nonscience person.5 
In some institutions either the unaffiliated member or 
the nonscience member (in some cases these are the 
same person) are professional philosophers who work 
in the field of bioethics. Among the duties of these 
mandated committees is passing judgment on all 
proposals to use animals as to whether the protocols 
are in compliance with Federal regulations regarding 
the use of animals in research, testing, or education, 
The basic criteria that these committees are required to 
employ in their judgments are 
1. that the proposed animal use is for a good purpose, 
2. that the justifying goals of the study cannot be 
achieved by some other methods that do not use 
animals, 
3. that the study is well designed, so that it is likely 
to achieve it goals, 
4. that the proposed use of animals is judicious in 
the number of animals that it is to use, and 
5. that all animal pain and suffering be reduced as 
far as possible consistent with the aims of the study. 
While the use of these committees, together with 
the enforcement of the 1985 federal regUlations by the 
USDA, NIH, and AAALAC, has brought about 
considerable improvements in the welfare of animals 
used in research, testing, and education, there remain 
some criticisms. One criticism is that the standards that 
these various committees use in applying these criteria 
vary greatly from institution to institution.6 To help in 
this regard, a nmnber of conversational networks have 
developed under the facilitation of such organizations 
as the National Institutes of Health, The Scientists 
Center for Animal Welfare, and Public Responsibility 
in Medicine and Research, and magazines such as Lab 
Animal. But there remains a more fundamental criticism 
from the anti-vivisectionist left: that these committees 
still do not address the fundamental ethical question 
regarding the justification for the exploitative use of 
animals in research, testing, and education. This 
question is, "Under what conditions, if any, is the 
exploitative use of morally considerable beings 
justified?" Until it can be shown that this question has 
been given a satisfactory answer, and that the 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees 
(IACUCs) guide their decision making by whatever 
principles can be developed from such an answer, anti-
vivisectionist critics will continue to regard those who 
support this form of regulation as "sell-outs." 
It is the nonscience, bioethicist philosophers who 
have participated as nonscience members of these 
committees that have been most sensitive to this 
criticism, I believe, and it is largely from them that there 
has developed a demand that IACUCs conform their 
decision making to ethical principles, yet these ethical 
principles have proven elusively difficult to articulate. 
I think there are several reasons for this. One reason is 
that it is philosophically problematic to give nonhuman 
animals some moral status, but not so much status that 
we are prevented from finding it morally acceptable to 
do things to them that we would find it unacceptable 
to do to humans. Strachan Donnelley sees this problem 
as the major one that "troubles" those who try to 
develop a middle position between those who find no 
exploitative use ofanimals justified and those who find 
any use justified. Donnelley refers to this middle 
position as "the troubled middle" (1989, et aI., 1990).7 
Another part of the problem is that even if the 
bioethicists connected to these regulatory efforts did 
develop an ethically viable middle position, they would 
still have to sell it to the other members of the 
committees, so as Rebecca Dresser points out, 
committee composition is a crucial issue (1988). The 
solution that troubled middelists like Donnelley (1989 
and et al., 1990), Dresser, and Lily-Marlene Russow 
(et al., 1990) have developed has been described as the 
"moral ecology approach," This approach recognizes a 
number of competing values, among which are animal 
welfare and the benefits of scientific inquiry. IACUCs 
must weigh these competing values and, in each case, 
decide how they best be taken into account, including 
which take priority over the other when yielding is 
required. Generally, when the substantial interests of 
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humans stand in conflict with the substantial interests 
of nonhuman animals, the latter yield because, morally 
speaking, among those beings that have moral status, 
some are less equal than others. Much of the moral 
theorizing that then follows is designed to justify the 
moral hierarchy that has been appealed to. However, 
since I tend to agree with critics of this position, such 
as S. F. Sapontzis (1988) and Tom Beauchamp (1992), 
I think this middle position theorizing is rightly troubled, 
and it is troubled because of its muddled thinking about 
the role of moral theorizing in this context. 
Because I think that its thinking is muddled at the 
level of theorizing, I want to go back and look more 
closely at Gary Varner's claim that both pro- and anti-
vivisectionists share a commitment to the same moral 
theorizings. I hope to show that one of the sources of the 
muddlement of the middle position is that it has taken 
the moral theorizing of Singer and of Regan out of the 
only context that justifies them, that they are intended to 
be theories of liberation. That is, their fundamental task 
is to identify victims of oppression and the social 
structures that cause this oppression. I think Singer and 
Regan have done a good job on this score, and it is this 
aspect of their theorizing that middle position bioethicists 
have rightfully accepted. But a philosophy of liberation 
that succeeds in identifying the victims of oppression 
may not do so well if it undertakes to theorize about ideal 
and unsituated moral and political relationships. If we 
look at the moral theorizing of Singer and Regan in this 
light., then they leave much to be desired, as I shall try to 
point outbelow. I shall also argue that it is just this feature 
of their theorizing (their unsituatedness) that has been 
imported into the middle position and that is the cause of 
much of its muddled thinking. To facilitate your following 
my line of argument, I will outline what I try to do in the 
remainder of this paper. 
1. My overall thesis is that moral theorizing is 
objectionably idealistic or utopian if it is done 
independently of the specific historical situations 
to which its occasion is tied. This is a "theory-
practice" thesis. 
2. Singer and Regan do moral theory both at the level 
of a situated liberation theory and at the level of 
utopian theorizing. 
3. The problems that middle position bioethicists 
should be addressing, when they develop ethical 
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theories, should be appropriately situated. Their 
historical situation is that they are bioethicists 
working in the context of a system where research 
facilities are required to regulate their use of 
animals through the mechanism of animal care 
committees. This particular mechanism was 
adopted as a political compromise beginning in 
1985, and a tenuous compromise at that. Enforced 
self-regulation by IACUCs should be regarded as 
an experiment. The grounds for recommending 
this particular practice of regulation was that it 
shared many of the features of similar models for 
regulating professional conduct.8 This means that 
bioethical theories designed to guide these 
practices should be aimed at reforming the 
practices so that they conform to appropriate 
ethical ideals or principles. That is, they should 
describe how these practices should be carried out 
so that these practices can be seen "in their best 
light."9 The source of these principles is the 
analogous practices that were regarded as 
exemplary forms of self-regulation. 
4. However, much ofmiddle position theorizing has 
been situated in the wrong way, and it attempts to 
conceal this fact by theorizing in an unsituated 
way. The point here is that middle position 
bioethicists, probably to preserve their voice in 
the conversation about reforming practices, have 
been so concerned with developing principles that 
would be acceptable to their pro-vivisectionist 
committee colleagues, that they have seriously 
compromised their goals. While working for some 
reform (higher standards in some areas), they also 
undertake to defend the practices that they are 
regulating, rather than to radically reform them 
so that they are as ethically defensible as possible 
under the circumstances. The defense they employ 
is to develop general unsituated theories very 
much of the sort that Regan and Singer employ 
when they theorize at the utopian level.1O 
5. Finally, IACUCs can draw from analogous 
regulatory bodies ethical principles that do a much 
better job of justifying tlleir practice, and tllese 
principles would do a much better job ofregulating 
the invasive use of animals in research than the 
current principles do, though the reforms that 
applying these principles would require would 
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significantly increase the cost of research and, 
most likely, prohibit some forms of research 
altogether. ll Nevertheless, even if these reforms 
were instituted, I do not believe that they would 
succeed in justifying the practice of using animals 
invasively in all cases. 
To develop my argument, let us look first at Gary 
Varner's account of the moral theories of Singer and 
Regan and what they have in common with pro-
vivisectionist theorizing. 
n. Varner on Regan and Singer 
According to Varner, researchers rnischaracterize the 
difference between animal rights and animal welfare 
advocates. Singer's Animal Liberation, which is the 
bible of PETA, uses the term "rights" loosely, to mean 
that animals have moral standing and that there are right 
and wrong ways of treating them. But in his Practical 
Ethics, which is the more theoretical work, he eschews 
the idea that animals (or humans) have rights. In the 
more technical sense, "having rights" means that some 
things cannot be done to the bearer of rights for the 
sake of benefit to others. Moral rights have been 
characterized as "trump cards" against the exclusive 
use of utilitarian principles. According to utilitarianism, 
any action could be justified under some possible 
circumstances. While on a rights view, regardless of 
the consequences, it is simply wrong to do some things 
to individuals. Varner thinks that most researchers are 
utilitarians when it comes to using animals but rights 
theorists when it comes to humans. Singer is a thorough-
going utilitarian on both counts. Researchers also share 
Singer's conception of hann-it is hedonistic. Singer 
holds a replacement theory of harm. If animals live a 
pleasant life and die a painless death, their lives can be 
replaced by other lives. Hence, humane animal 
agriculture is all right. But Singer does not apply this 
conception of harm to animals capable of self-
consciousness who lead tlleir own lives and want to go 
on living. All maDlffials are self-conscious in this sense, 
according to Singer. Self-consciousness equals forward 
looking desires. Here Singer becomes a preference 
utilitarian. Varner doubts that most mammals have 
forward looking desires to the extent that we can say 
tlmt they want to go on living. Singer would allow that 
an experiment using one animal to save many lives is 
justified. His criticism against research is that most of 
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it is not like this. Thus, the disagreement between Singer 
and the research establishment is an empirical question 
about how likely various kinds of research are to lead 
to important human benefits (and in Varner's mind, 
about whether animals are capable of experiencing 
forward looking desires). 
Regan's position is that all animals have the basic 
right not to be harmed by moral agents, not even on the 
ground that doing so benefits others, and all animals 
who can be harmed in the relevant ways have this right. 
Regan conceives of harm as a diminution in the capacity 
to form and satisfy desires. All animals that can have 
desires have this right. Death is the greatest harm 
because it completely destroys one's capacity to form 
and satisfy desires. When harming is inevitable, use 
the worse-off principle when deciding whom to harm. 
Death to a normal human being is noncomparably worse 
than death to any nonhuman animal. In the life raft 
example where the carrying capacity is exceeded by 
the weight of anyone of the two humans and the one 
dog that it now carries, eliminate the dog rather than 
any of the humans, because the humans stand to lose 
the most. Where there are comparable harms, use the 
miniride principle: harm the few rather than the many. 
Although Regan opposes all use of animals in research, 
he ought not to oppose cases where sacrificing animals 
will save humans, according to Varner. Regan opposes 
applying the worse-off principle to animals in research 
because of special considerations: that they do not 
voluntarily assume the risks. Only if we were testing a 
cure for a currently incurable disease on an animal that 
had already contracted the disease would the assumption 
of risk involuntarily be justified. Varner argues, 
however, that most people believe that we can 
involuntarily transfer risks to other humans, as in the 
case of war or forming a new economic policy. 
III. The Theoretical Assets and Liabilities 
of Singer and Regan 
As liberationists, Singer and Regan have argued 
successfully that nonhuman animals should be granted 
moral status. They are, to use Regan's term, "subjects-
of-a-life" and as such have inherent value, as opposed 
to merely instrumental value. 12 But the central point of 
Regan's account of the lives of nonhuman animals is 
his use of the continuity thesis to justify our attribution 
to nonhuman animals of most of the morally 
considerable qualities that we attribute to ourselves. 
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Regan rejects the charge that in attributing these morally 
considerable attributes to nonhuman animals we are 
guilty of anthropomorphizing-that is, we are guilty 
of illegitimately ascribing to other animals features that 
only humans have. Regan's position has been largely 
accepted by bioethicist middle positioners in their 
acceptance of what they call "critical anthropo-
morphism," (Morton et al., 1990) and at least some 
elements of this position have been incorporated in the 
USDA regulations where pain in animals is defined 
based on the assumption that, unless otherwise 
warranted, nonhuman animals must be assumed to feel 
what humans would feel under similar situations 
(USDA, 1990: A.1.§1.l) In general, Regan's and 
Singer's influence is most clearly evident in the middle 
position's acceptance of the claim that nonhuman 
animals have moral status.J3 
Their influence in two other dimensions, however, 
is more subtle. One dimension is the use that Regan 
makes of his worse-off principle to guide us in situations 
where we must choose between whose life is to be 
sacrificed in situations that require that a choice be made 
(otherwise either all in the situation will die, or at least 
some will). He generalizes this intuitively obvious 
principle from situations where, when someone must 
pay an indivisible cost, the person who can most afford 
it should pay the cost, to situations where the cost is 
death. To do this, he must analyze the sort of harm that 
death brings to different individuals in such a way that 
these harms can be compared. His solution is adopted 
from a paper that Donald VanDeVeer published in 
Inquiry in 1979 on the topic of interspecific justice. 
Borrowing a notion from economics, VanDeVeer 
suggests that we view death as foreclosing windows of 
opportunity that the decedent would otherwise have had. 
Regan then uses the example of a life raft, with several 
humans and a (large) dog, that is overburdened in terms 
of capacity and resources by just one subject-of-a-life. 
Who must go over board? The solution is that, all other 
things being equal, since most humans have the capacity 
to live richer (or more psychologically complex) lives 
than most dogs, the dog must go, because sacrificing 
the dog will cause less of a loss to the dog than 
sacrificing a human will cause for that human.14 This 
interpretation of how the worse-off principle is to be 
used has several undesirable consequences for a theory 
of liberation, especially when it is embedded in a 
libertarian rights political philosophy that is implicit in 
Regan's moral theory. One of them is that while it grants 
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moral status to victims of oppression (in this case, 
nonhuman subjects-of-a-life), it preserves the basis for 
a moral hierarchy, or, in the words of middle position 
theorists, while all subjects-of-a-life are morally equal, 
some are more equal than others. So, if someone's moral 
rights are to be limited, we should choose those lower 
on the hierarchy. Of course, it would be a mistake to 
suppose that we could use Regan's vision of how the 
worse-off principle is to be interpreted in the life-boat 
scenario to justify using animal models in research, 
since it is probably never the case that we encounter 
the life-boat scenario in research decision making. But 
that is beside the point. 
Let me emphasize the point 1 want to make here. It 
is Regan's use of his worse-off principle in situations 
like the above one (plus his use of the notion of inherent 
value to make the point that all subjects-of-a-life have 
moral considerability) that justifies qualifying the claim 
that all subjects-of-a-life have moral status by the claim 
that some subjects-of-a-life have a higher moral status 
than others, and it is just this feature of Regan's moral 
theory that is utilized by middle position bioethicists to 
justify the practice of sacrificing the interests of 
nonhuman animals to the interests of human ones when 
choices must be made. ls 
There is another feature of Regan's (and Singer's) 
moral theorizing that contributes to what 1 find 
objectionable about middle position theorizing. This 
feature is the utopian component of the theorizing-
that is, that in addition to developing a theory of 
oppression, there is also embedded in this theory a 
broader but unsituated theory that attempts to portray a 
set of ideal relationships between different types of 
subjects-of-a-life. Regan develops this ideal picture by 
first making a distinction between moral agents and 
moral patients, and then dividing subjects-of-a -life into 
those that are merely moral patients and those that have 
the capacity to be both. Regan's solution to the problem 
of how these two types of moral beings should relate to 
each other is that they should occupy different 
kingdoms. He takes this position in response to the 
question of what sort of wildlife management policy 
we should adopt. For Regan, such a position is a 
desirable solution to what might otherwise seem to be 
a paradox. If human subjects-of-a-life expect to be 
protected in their liberty rights by the moral community 
ofmoral agents, whose j ob it is to protect moral patients 
from immoral agents (or even from innocent liberty 
limiters), then we might also expect that the moral 
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community of moral agents ought to protect merely 
moral patients from other merely moral patients who 
limit their liberties, as in managing predator-prey 
relationships in nature. But Regan refuses to go that 
far. Humans should leave merely moral patients alone 
to manage their own affairs. While this might seem to 
be a morally unacceptable solution, Regan justifies it 
by claiming that since it is merely moral patients 
committing these acts, they are not immoral acts, as 
though the object of moral management was solely to 
prevent moral agents from committing immoral acts.16 
But this theorizing, even if it might be otherwise morally 
acceptable, is utopian just because it relies on a 
distinction that ignores the reality of our (humans) 
relationships with nonhuman subjects-of-a-life. 
Humans have been instrumental in changing "the 
natural world" to such a degree that we cannot avoid 
taking responsibility for some of the relationships that 
now exist between what Regan calls moral patients. 
To refuse to employ wildlife management practices 
that try to rectify some of the predator-prey imbalances 
that have resulted from the effects of human choices 
is irresponsible. 17 
What is theoretically objectionable about Regan's 
position is that it theorizes against the background of 
some general utopian scenario about ideal relationships. 
It cannot, therefore, be employed to develop a situation 
specific set of ethical principles without running the 
risk of having the very principles that Regan intends to 
use to protect animals used to justify their exploitation. 
And this is specifically the pattern of argument that the 
middle position adopts in its moral theorizing. Strachan 
Donnelley, for example, develops his respect for life 
position by portraying the natural world as a place 
governed by the fundamental law of metabolic 
existence, a law that governs the competition to capture 
energy. In this system, it is a fact that life feeds on life. 
I[ we are to make choices about which lives to sacrifice 
first, we should choose the less complexly active and 
less complexly related forms of organic life, because 
these have less inherent value. Of course, humans are 
at the top of this moral hierarchy. So, Donnelley's 
theorizing assumes a natural order of things, which is 
then used to justify the (regrettable but natural) 
sacrificing of the interests of what is lower in the 
scheme of things to the interest of what it higher in 
the scheme of things. 
Finally, we could say the same thing about Singer's 
mode of theorizing to the extent that it depends on some 
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global vision of ideal moral communities toward which 
our expanding moral consciousness is developing in a 
Kohlbergian fashion. It thus moves from a theory to 
identify oppression and its causes to a theory of the 
utopia that we should strive to attain, but in doing so 
preserves the moral order of things that justifies the 
oppression in the first place. ls 
Up to this point, I have given some indication of 
what I think is objectionable about current middle 
position moral theorizing, why it is muddled, and what 
some of the theoretical sources of the muddle are. In 
doing this, I have set out my arguments for points 1,2, 
4, and some of 3 listed above. What I have not done is 
to suggest ways in which a more historically situated 
search for ethical principles for IACUCs should be 
conducted. To begin that discussion, let us look at 
current practices in IACUCs to see what sort of ethical 
principles they could be said to employ. Then we will 
see whether any of the moral theorizing can be of any 
help in introducing better principles. I will suggest that 
they are minimally useful, except in their oppression 
specific analysis. Then I will move on to the final stage 
of my argument, which is to suggest just what sorts of 
principles would be appropriate and why. 
IV. The Current Role of Ethical Principles 
in IACUCs 
It is not very clear what sorts of principles these 
committees are supposed to use in carrying out some 
of their functions. 19 It is spelled out very clearly, 
however, that it is not the function of these committees 
to interfere with the conduct of legitimate scientific 
activities. This seems to mean that in its deliberations, 
committee members may not appeal to abolitionist 
principles, nor to principles that would support the 
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position that any use of animals in science is justified. 
In other words, IACUC members, whatever their 
differences, should share some "middle" position 
between the extremes represented by anti-vivisectionists 
and unrestricted use advocates. This middle position 
has been characterized as one shared by those who wish 
to reform the current use of animals in science in order 
to promote the welfare of the animals being used. In 
the context of legitimizing the use of IACUCs as a 
satisfactory mechanism for regulating the use of animals 
in research, IACUCs must try to meet their critics' 
claim, that all such use is unethical, by trying to show 
that IACUCs use sound ethical principles in distin-
guishing between legitimate and illegitimate uses. Much 
of the trouble that the troubled middle has encountered 
is in trying to identify what these principles mightbe.20 
One principle is universally applied, and even mandated 
by law: that animals should not be used in research, 
especially if it is exploitative, unless using these animals 
is necessary in order to achieve some legitimate end. 
For the sake ofconvenience, let us call this the Principle 
ofNecessity. Another principle that is clearly used, and 
mandated, is that when the use of animals is justified 
by the Principle of Necessity, they must be used in such 
a way that the interests of the animals are compromised 
as little as possible consistent with attaining the ends 
appealed to in the Principle of Necessity. I suppose we 
can call this the Principle of Minimizing the Costs.21 
The first principle raises two important questions. 
1. Which ends legitimate the proposed exploitative 
use? and 
2. How likely is it that the proposed use will make a 
major contribution to achieving the justifying ends? 
The second principle raises a third important but 
controversial question. 
3. What are the likely costs of the various methods 
by which the proposed ends might be reached? 
There is some evidence that IACUCs are concerned 
with trying to answer questions (2) and (3), but generally 
question (1) has proven to be too difficult.22 If the 
proposed exploitative use of animals is an attempt to 
produce socially useful knowledge (information), then 
it is generally considered to be legitimate, and, in fact, 
the intent of the legislation that mandated IACUCs 
seems to be to allow that questions about what sorts of 
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knowledge are useful are science policy questions that 
are better addressed at the level of funding decisions.23 
Question (2) is usually thought to be an issue of 
scientific merit, and, while IACUCs have tended to stay 
clear of trying to make such decisions, the literature 
discussing IACUC issues suggests that there is some 
consensus being approached about the need to monitor 
this question at least to some degree.24 In trying to 
answer the third question, IACUC members are often 
faced with a serious epistemological question 
concerning what costs the exploited animals are being 
required to pay, and much of the welfare reform that 
proponents of a middle position have urged concerns 
the need to pay more attention to the question about the 
criteria for identifying appropriate costs and for telling 
whether these costs will be paid in a particular 
situation.25 Applying this principle, however, still tends 
to get bogged down by the ghosts of Cartesian 
skepticism about other, and especially nonhuman, minds 
that still haunts the sciences.26 
One would expect, however, that there are at least 
two purposes to be served in estimating the cost to the 
animal models being used. One is to be sure that all 
steps available are taken to minimize or alleviate these 
costs, either by choosing alternative means to conduct 
the study that cause less pain and suffering, or by 
applying appropriate anesthetic, analgesic and other 
remedial care to animals who would otherwise 
experience these costs. The other purpose would be to 
try to weigh the costs to the animal models against the 
value that is to be gained from the study in order to 
determine whether the benefits outweigh the costs, 
forgetting for the moment the ethical problem about 
how these costs and benefits are to be distributed. While 
I believe that serious efforts are being made by IACUCs 
to estimate harm in order to serve the first purpose, I do 
not see much of a willingness to employ weighing 
principles about costs and benefits, though in studies 
where an unpleasant death is an endpoint in the study 
or where there is serious, long-lasting and unmitigated 
suffering, committees have tended to require a stronger 
justification for the study than in other cases. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a principle here that 
wants substance. One problem with giving it substance 
is seeing research as part of "a complex web of 
interrelated activity from many disciplines, whose 
results are always uncertain but which nevertheless may 
contribute to "scientific advance." (Donnelley et al., 
1990) Generally, IACUCs require that the researcher 
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provide some justification of the use of animals that 
will show that this use will contribute to either basic or 
applied scientific knowledge. 
In actual practice, grading studies in terms of the 
costs that they impose on the animal subjects seems to 
serve several, perhaps conflicting purposes, and I think 
that these should be pointed out. At the most 
fundamental level, grading is required by USDA 
regulations in order to ensure that when a study might 
jeopardize the well-being of the animal subject, 
appropriate steps be taken to minimize the harm. In 
practice, IACUCs may use grading for additional 
purposes. One purpose is an administrative one. How 
much time should IACUCs spend in scrutinizing the 
applications that animal users make for IACUC 
approval? The less harm that the proposed use visits on 
the animal subjects, the less scrutiny is needed. The 
greater the harm, the more scrutiny. A second reason is 
an educational one. Grading may serve to call to the 
attention of the investigator the moral costs involved 
in the study. While I think that this is a legitimate 
purpose, both to counteract the Cartesian mindset of 
scientists and to put the conscience of the investigator 
on some public display, it also shifts the ethical weighing 
of the costs and benefits of the project from the 
committee to the investigator, and I think that this is 
too great a concession to the principle of professional 
autonomy. That is, while I am in favor ofmaking people 
assume more ethical responsibility for their decisions, 
in performing this educational function IACUCs are in 
danger of giving up their regulatory role and replacing 
it with an advisory one. A third purpose for grading 
studies is to put the institution in a better light in regard 
to potential critics, by showing that it is less the number 
of animals used in research that is objectionable, than 
how harmful their use has proven to be for the animal 
subjects. But I do not think that IACUCs have any 
business taking on this task, any more than middle 
position ethical theorists have in taking on the task of 
justifying the practice of using animals in research. And 
I think that there is an important connection between 
the way that IACUCs grade, partly with this purpose in 
mind, and the function that middle position theorizing 
plays in justifying lab animal use. 
In general, theorizing at the middle level seems less 
concerned with developing principles for weighing 
conflicting values in practice than it does with justifying 
giving less weight to the moral status of nonhuman 
animals. That is, the major use ofmiddle level theorizing 
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is to show that animals have interests that should be 
protected where possible, but then to justify sacrificing 
these interests in accord with the Principle ofNecessity. 
This stance is perhaps more evident in the case of how 
death is to be regarded. Neither IACUCs, in practice, 
nor middle position theorists do an adequate job of 
assessing the harm that death is. 
Although there is an official recognition that death 
is a harm in the principle that using animals as models 
in research is to be avoided when possible (the three 
Rs), killing animals is not generally considered to be 
causing them a serious harm, and the fact that a protocol 
will cause the death of the animal subject is not, in 
practice, regarded as a good reason for grading it at the 
weightier end of the harm classification scale. For 
example, euthanasia is standardly recommended as an 
acceptable form of anesthesia. Furthermore, animals 
used in research are characteristically euthanatized after 
a study as a form of disposal. If providing support for 
the animals is not considered to be economically 
feasible, nor is release or adoption, then killing them is 
considered routine. This under-assessing of the harm 
that death is is reinforced at the level ofmiddle position 
theorizing whose principle task is thought to be to 
provide, in general terms, a standard justification for 
permitting the killing of nonhuman animals under 
conditions that would not be acceptable when applied 
Lo human animals. That justification is that nonhuman 
animal life is of less inherent value than human life, 
and under some principle of necessity, given certain 
legitimate ends, it is morally permissible to kill 
nonhuman animals even in cases in which it would not 
be morally pennissible to kill humans. There are at least 
three different sorts of cases in which euthanasia is 
regarded as justified. 
1. In some cases the study requires the death of the 
animal in order to complete the study, such as 
where the effects on the internal organs of a 
procedure are to be studied in such a way that they 
need to be permanenUy separated from the subject. 
2. In some cases the study causes such a significant 
amount of harm to the subject that it could not 
live comfortably afterwards. Here, euthanasia 
serves as an anesthesia or analgesic. 
3. In many cases the funds needed to support the 
research, including providing welfare support for 
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the subject, are not adequate to provide main-
tenance after the study is completed, and there are 
no other means of support available. Under these 
circumstances euthanasia is a better alternative 
than providing no maintenance. 
The focus of the moral theorizing seems to be on 
the fIrst case, where the death of the animal subject is 
required by the study. But in cases 2 and 3, death is 
offered as a remedy or solution to a problem: how to 
avoid some sort of suffering brought about by the 
diminution in the quality of the subject's life. The logic 
of the fact that euthanasia is regarded as a form of 
anesthesia seems to dictate that death be regarded as a 
lesser harm than the pain and suffering that it is thought 
to avoid. For that reason, studies that kill without pain 
are regarded as less costly to the subject than studies 
that cause pain. It is simply another step to then regard 
loss of life as having no signifIcant moral consequences, 
since, by our system of grading, non-survival surgery 
protocols, for example, require little scrutiny by the 
IACUC, call for little pricking of the conscience of the 
investigator, and show up on the institutional animal 
use reports as uses that are not graded as having much 
moral signifIcance. Something seems wrong here, and 
I do not see any middle level ethical theorizing done to 
address this question. Part of the problem with this 
failure, I have already suggested, is that the moral 
theorizing is done by trying to place killing animals in 
research use within tl1e grand scheme of things, a grand 
scheme where it is tl10ught to be only natural, even if 
regrettable, that higher forms of life kill lower forms. 
But theorizing done against this backdrop gives us very 
little guidance for entering into responsible relationships 
with animals, except when we undertake a warden 
relationship with animals, we must treat them humanely. 
What sort of moralizing might do a better job? 
Let me identify at this point the stage of the overall 
argument we have reached. Middle position moral 
theorizing, done in conjunction with providing ethical 
principles for IACUCs, has done a tolerably good job 
of revealing some of the dimensions in which animals 
are exploitatively used in research. It has done this by 
advancing a richer conception of animal life than 
previously accepted as normative for the practice of 
using animals in research. Another way of putting this 
is that it has shown that animals should have at least so 
much moral status that treating them inhumanely is 
regarded as immoral, and it has shown that much of 
Winter & Spring 1996 
our previous treatment of animals in research was, in 
fact, inhumane. This a signifIcant contribution to a 
philosophy of oppression, because it helps reveal 
previously unseen dimensions to the identity of victims 
of oppression, and in doing so reveals the fact of their 
oppression. But the theorizing stops at this point and 
moves on to a different project-the project ofjustifying 
compromising the interests of lower order animals when 
doing so serves the interests of higher order animals. I 
think that taking on that project is a fundamental 
mistake. What should middle level theorizing have done 
instead, and what should it do now? My answer is that 
it should try to articulate principles for IACUCs to 
follow that, if followed, put the practices that are 
regulated by these principles into their most justifIed 
form. But theorizing should be prepared to refrain, at 
this point, from then arguing that these practices so 
regulated are in fact justified. That is a different 
question. In my conclusion, I shall make some 
suggestions about what sorts of things we should think 
about before trying to answer that larger question about 
justifying the practice. 
V. An Improved Role for Ethical Pdnciples 
inIACUCs 
What ethical principles are appropriate for IACUCs to 
use? How do we decide this? The middle position takes 
the question to be "How can we show that some uses 
of animals in research are justified?" It interprets the 
question in this way because it sees itself as looking for 
the mean between denying that any (invasive) uses are 
justifIed and asserting that all uses are. But this is the 
wrong conception of the task. What middle position 
bioethicists should be asking is: "Given the role of 
IACUCs, how can they best carry out that role?" But, 
of course, one of the controversial questions is "What 
should the role of IACUCs be?" since many of the 
dimensions are not well specifIed by the regulations 
that mandate them. This normative question must be 
viewed through the historical setting, that is, the set of 
problems that IACUCs were introduced to solve and 
the reasons that can be given for supposing tl1at IACUCs 
are a reasonable instrument for solving these problems. 
To be brief on this point, IACUCs were introduced as a 
compromise between community regulation of 
professional activity and professional self-regulation 
(Rowan, 1990; U. S. Congress, OTA, 1986). The need 
to compromise the claims for the rights of professionals 
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to regulate themselves is summarized by Michael 
Bayles (1984,1989). There are several models for this 
type of compromise, but the appropriate ones for the 
IACUC mechanism are those that are designed to 
protect the interests of human patients who cannot 
speak for themselves, and human research subjects 
who might be put at risk without their consent. In each 
case, wardens, or boards that act as wardens, are 
appointed to interpret and protect the interests of either 
the clients of professionals or the subjects of their 
research (in many cases the wards fit into both 
categories) against the interests of the professionals who 
are empowered to make decisions about what the wards 
will have done to them. In short, it is the primary 
function of IACUCs to act as advocates to protect the 
interests of animals used in research, etc. The closest 
analogy to this projected role for IACUCs are federally 
mandated Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), whose 
role it is to monitor and approve the use of human 
subjects in research. Of course, the issue is whether 
IACUCs should try to give their subjects the same 
degree of protection that IRBs give theirs. 
One problem with using IRBs as models, it has been 
maintained, is that IRBs function to protect the 
autonomy of the human research subject by limiting 
the kind or degree of harm that such subjects might 
experience and by requiring that subjects consent to 
other risks of harm that might result from the study. 
The doctrine of informed consent and the goal of 
preserving subject autonomy has no possible application 
to nonhuman animals subjects, it is argued. But this is 
surely not the case. Just as consent is constructed for 
incompetent humans, it can be constructed for animal 
wards used in research. Here, we can also appeal to 
analogies drawn from somewhat more consentful 
relationships in which autonomy is preserved, at least 
to a high degree. These are relationships humans 
develop with domesticated animals companionship or 
for work, or both. It is certainly reasonable to expect 
work from a work animal in exchange for room, board, 
health care, affection, and other rewards. Assuming that 
we are adequately informed about the animals' wants, 
needs, preferences, and, in short, interests, we are 
justified in believing that our animals would choose 
their situation to the extent that they are aware of the 
benefits that they derive as weighed against the costs 
that they must incur by being required to work and to 
lose some of their freedom. We also construct consent 
when we require a child to submit to restrictions or to 
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slightly painful medical treatment. "It is for their own 
good." If we apply this principle to research contexts, 
then IACUCs could be asked to judge whether research 
animals are receiving adequate care in exchange for 
their work and to insure that their work not exceed their 
remuneration. Otherwise, they are being exploited. In 
fact, the suggestion has been advanced within the 
research community that animals being used in 
strenuous or painful research should accumulate 
retirement points and following the accumulation of 
enough retirement points should "be put out to pasture," 
so to speak. But this suggestion has not received much 
support, except perhaps for the great apes, because it 
would significantly increase the cost of doing research. 
But that fact should not count against it as an appropriate 
ethical principle for IACUCs to employ.27 
While we could use this principle in cases that do 
not require the death of the research subject, it would 
be more difficult to apply in cases where death is 
required. When we reach this point, the boundary line 
between reforming the practice to make it as litlle 
objectionable as possible and deciding whether the 
practice, at its best, is justified must be approached. 
Here, some other analogies might be helpful. Humans 
develop many relationships with nonhuman animals 
besides using them as research subjects. Some of these 
relationships are actively cultivated, as in the 
domestication of food, work, and companion animals, 
while other relationships seem to be more adventitious, 
for want of a better word, but none of them are totally 
innocent The moral theorizing we are rejecting for 
IACUCs asks us to view all of our relationships with 
nonhuman animals under three somewhat competing 
paradigms, though there is some overlap between two 
of these. One of these is the Two Kingdoms paradigm. 
Moral problems only occasionally erupt-When there 
are border disputes. The other two paradigms envision 
a single community of life. Singer's community of 
subjects-of-a-life is a civilized community, because it 
has been built out of expanding the human community. 
The middle position community is closer to Leopold's 
"biotic community" because it is constructed from the 
bottom up. Civilization is at the top of this community, 
which is built on the moral hierarchy of sacrificing the 
less complexly organized for the more complexly 
organized. This is a fundamental law of the Kingdom 
of Nature. While I realize that using these particular 
metaphors risks distorting each of these views, I never-
theless want to utilize them to try to make three points. 
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One point I have made already. That is an objection 
to global level or God's eye or unsituated ethical 
theorizing. Among the objections to this form of 
theorizing are 
1. that it represents a biased perspective as an 
unbiased one-"the view from nowhere." 
2. It invariably introduces a justification for moral 
hierarchies that naturalizes these hierarchies, and 
3. it conceals from us the various forms of respon-
sibility that we have undertaken in choosing our 
relationships with other forms of life. 
The second point I am trying to make by introducing 
these metaphors concerns the last objection I just raised. 
Instead of viewing any form of interaction that we 
choose to engage in with other animals as one in which 
the moral disputes will be resolved on the principle, 
sacrifice the lower for the higher, we should consider 
whether we have constituted these relationships 
responsibly. And to decide that, we need to discover 
the appropriate principles for judging what these 
responsibilities are. There are analogies between 
relationships between domesticated work animals and 
domesticated lab animals, for example. If there is to be 
a community, then employers and employees must each 
get a fair deal. But where death is required of lab 
animals, the analogy between domesticated food 
animals and lab animals prevails. Here there is a 
continuum from less to more exploitative uses, and 
the closer to the latter pole the practice comes, the 
greater the difficulty ofjustifying it as a practice that is 
being conducted according to moral principles. At the 
better end, domesticated species of animals that might 
not otherwise be able to provide for themselves are 
given the opportunity to live a life, but the quantity of 
that life is constrained by the conditions under which 
that support can be reasonably expected to be provided. 
At the other pole, the question remains whether it is 
fair to the individuals bred under these conditions to 
have lived at all. 
But there are other forms our relationships take that 
seem more adventitious. That is, we do not choose to 
cultivate these forms, but rather we encounter them. 
These are the border disputes from Regan's Two 
Kingdoms approach. Here, we encounter various 
forms of "pests." These "pests" prey on crops and 
domesticated animals, threaten poor children in slums, 
invade our homes, and deplete the biological diversity 
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of our environments. How should we regard our 
relationship with these animals? The answer is not as 
border disputes between natural kingdoms but as 
disputes about how resources are to be distributed. 
While such disputes can be seen as part of the "natural 
order of things," that is, as going on even if humans 
weren't involved, the particular disputes described 
above take the particular form that they do because of 
the human presence. Human choices form the contexts 
for how these disputes have congealed, so we cannot 
pass off our responsibility for managing what we have 
helped to generate. Nor are we justified in appealing to 
the principle of the natural moral hierarchy in solving 
the conflicts of interests these disputes seem to involve. 
This brings us to the third point. If we do not appeal 
to natural moral hierarchies, is there any way of 
conceptualizing the claim that all subjects-of-a-life have 
moral status without bringing natural moral hierarchies 
in through the backdoor? I am going to take a stab at 
answering this question. I think it is useful to consider 
the variety of relationships that we are called upon to 
manage if we are to govern our relationships with other 
animals ethically, and equally useful to realize that we 
should not view the whole of the natural order as falling 
under our responsibility to manage. I think Regan is 
right when he suggests that we should not try to manage 
the whole natural kingdom, not because it is not our 
responsibility to do so, but because we have neither 
the knowledge nor the ability for such extensive 
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management. Buthe is wrong in saying that we should 
not try to manage the aspects of it with which we have 
entered into relationships. He is wrong because 1) we 
cannot, in fact, draw the borders he proposes, and 2) 
because we have not drawn them in the past and we 
now have a responsibility to minimize the harm we have 
caused in the past. The point of limiting the scope of 
our management is to avoid falling into the trap of 
appealing to the natural order of things to warrant our 
management decisions. It is useful to view the variety 
of our relationships to avoid the other extreme, which 
is that since all animal life that we undertake to manage 
we manage as incompetent wards, we are entitled to 
set down the conditions under which we will continue 
to give them support-Le., only to the extent that we 
get something back from them. What I propose is that 
we consider all of the forms of management we 
undertake as human managers of subject-of-life 
communities to be governed by principles of distributive 
justice. This conception of subjects-of-a-life is one that 
views them as all equally wanting to live. They are in 
conflict when the control of the resources they need to 
maintain their lives is in dispute. Every life is of equal 
value to that life, so there are no moral hierarchies. The 
harm of death is not that some future life has been taken 
away from the decedent. It is only that, at least up to a 
point, we all want as much of it as we can get. We are 
wronged when we get less than our fair share because 
others have got more than their fare share. So, while 
we are not ethically bound to keep others alive, unless 
we have bargained to do so, we are ethically bound to 
share our resources with all who want them, because 
they are not really ours. Rather than try to develop this 
idea any further here, I want to turn briefly to another 
point, one that relates to our original concern about 
moral hierarchies, theories of oppression, and thinking 
about the harm that death is.28 
This point is that while there appears to be a great 
temptation to rank subjects-of-a-life in terms of scales 
of richness, and then to use these rankings to argue that 
it causes greater harm to take away a richer future than 
a poorer one, I simply do not see how we can be justified 
in yielding to this temptation, and this point has been 
convincing argued by S. F. Sapontzis (1987,1988). First 
of all, how can we possibly say how rich the lives of 
other animals are? Sapontzis makes a number of 
suggestions as to why we might think the contrary. But 
even if it were true, how does this warrant the claim 
that the lives of the poorer should yield to the lives of 
Between the Species 30 
the richer? This is precisely the humanistic arrogance 
that underlies the libertarian political philosophy ofTom 
Regan, which claims that liberty is more valuable to 
the powedul than it is to the weak, therefore they should 
have more of it. On that point, I had better stop. 
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Notes 
1 The term "vivisection" might be thought to be a 
somewhat misleading characterization of all of the types of 
research using animals that "anti-vivisectionists" object to, 
since it implies that the research involves surgery on living 
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animals. Not all experimental surgery on live animals is 
necessarily objectionable, nor do all objectionable or 
"invasive" uses of animal in science necessarily involve 
surgery. For a brief history of the antivisectionist movement 
see Ritvo, 1984. 
2First of all, I don't think that all pro-vivisectionists share 
a common moral theory. Furthermore, if Varner means that 
all biomedical researchers share a commitment to the 
doctrine of informed consent for human subjects, I doubt 
very much that the acceptance of this doctrine is so wide-
spread in the medical community that it has been internalized 
by all biomedical scientists. See, for example, Katz, 1993. 
But, if we are talking about their own personal political 
philosophy, many of the members of the biomedical research 
community may, in fact, hold Regan's politically conser-
vative libertarian rights philosophy when it comes to 
defending their own "academic freedom," or their right to 
dispose of their own personal property as they wish, at the 
same time that they might try to justify the very large 
appropriations of public funds for biomedical research by 
appealing to some theory of distributive justice that is 
difficult to find in Regan, or by appealing to a utilitarian 
based theory regarding the beneficial effects of biomedical 
research on the general welfare. 
3 See, for example, Donnelley, 1989; Donnelley et ai., 
1990; and Dresser, 1988. 
4 For a general account of the history of this legislation, 
see Moss, 1984, and Zolaet ai., 1984. For background on the 
development of the type of enforced self-regulation that the 
use of these committees requires see U.S. Congress, OTA, 
1986, Rowan, 1990, and Orlans, 1993. 
5 While the requirements of the two acts are slightly 
different, nearly all committees comply with both. What roles 
these various members are to play is not spelled out. For 
alternative conceptions of these roles see Rowan 1990, Orlans, 
1993, and Dresser, 1990. In practice, these committees are 
dominated by pro-vivisectionist lab animal users. 
6 See Dresser, 1988, 1989a and b; Prentice et ai., 1990, 
1991,1992. 
7 This characterization might be a bit unfair, since, as 
both Dresser (1988) and Donnelley (1989) and Donnelley 
et at. (1990) point out, part of the issue concerns freedom 
of inquiry and the right of researchers to regulate their own 
use. So it is more of an issue of who regulates than of what 
principles are used in deciding what uses are acceptable 
and what not. 
8 See OTA, 1986 for a review of alternative regulatory 
mechanisms available and the recommended analogy between 
IACDCs and the use of Institutional Review Boards for 
regulating the use of human subjects in research. 
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9 I have borrowed this expression from Dworkin (1986: 
90), in order to suspend the question whether using animals 
in research is ever justified. 
10 I don't want to be unfair to my bioethicist peers on 
this point. Dresser (1988), for example, correctly identifies 
one of the obstacles to using higher ethical standards-the 
composition of committee members, and she thinks that this 
is one area that merits political struggle. There is an 
additional point. Even if these committees were composed 
entirely of appropriately enlightened bioethicists, there are 
some legal questions about what authority these committees 
might have to employ principles that placed greater 
limitations on the use of animals than do the regulations 
developed by the agencies that were empowered to interpret 
the federal legislation. 
II These principles have been advanced by others, but I 
hope to add some refinement to how their use can be justified. 
See, for example, AWl, 1979. 
12 I've neverfound either the notion of inherent or intrinsic 
value very helpfUl when used to characterize what deserves 
moral consideration, and both terms carry the implicit 
question, "How much value?" 
13 Regan distinguishes between being a moral patient and 
being a moral agent. Generall y. nonhuman animals are moral 
patients but not moral agents. 
14 VanDeVeer denies that this moral decision is speciesistic 
(does not arbitrarily favor humans) because in some situations, 
say where one of the humans is a severely retarded human 
and the nonhuman animal is a cross-cultured chimp, then the 
human must go. 
15 Embedded in a libertarian political philosophy, this 
interpretation of the worse-off principle would also justify 
killing less well off humans (humans who have fewer 
resources available to them) in preference to (financially) 
better endowed humans. In general, libertarians Who put 
primary value on liberty but do not address the fact that 
liberty is more valuable to the more powerful than the less 
powerful are guilty of perpetuating the hierarchy of 
oppression rather than providing some foundation for 
liberation. Singer is somewhat more difficult to pin down 
on this point, though he does say two things that are suspect. 
One is that he seems to allow that the harm in death is the 
harm in taking away what is wanted (more life) or, frustrating 
preference satisfaction, so subjects that are capable of 
, wanting more (because they are self-conscious and can 
project their lives into the future) are harmed more by death 
than those capable of wanting less. The other is that he seems 
to allow that if there were cases where we had to sacrifice 
one individual to save a large number of others, say in a 
research situation, then it might be justified, but he does not 
address the question about how we assign the task of making 
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the sacrifice fairly to some specific individuals. The moral 
hierarchy is also implicit in the continuity thesis that Regan 
uses to break through the charges that we anthropomorphize 
(illegitimately) when we ascribe states that we are familiar 
with in humans to nonhuman animals. 
16 I suppose it is this feature of Regan's position that 
justifies us in calling him a deontologist. 
17 Unfortunately, we cannot always predict what other 
detrimental effects our attempts to rectify past mistakes might 
have, but that is no excuse for a hands-off approach to nature. 
In one way or another, we are remaking nature with nearly 
every choice we make. See Busch, 1989. 
18 John Rodman (1977: Parts 4 and 5) makes a similar 
point in his review of Christopher Stone's Should Trees Have 
Standing and Peter Singer's Animal Liberation, namely that 
if we view liberation in terms of an expanding moral 
community, then nonhuman animals (and natural systems) 
will always be our poor cousins with lower moral status. 
19 See, for example, U. S. Congress, OTA, 1986, Canadian 
Federation ofHumane Societies, 1986, Dresser, 1990, Rowan, 
1990, OPRR, 1986, and Orlans, 1993. 
20 Russow et al. (1990) review what they take to be the 
major ethical theories available for committee members to 
use and suggest what results applying them would yield. In 
each case, a lot of research currently approved would be ruled 
out, unless we deny that animals have any moral status. 
21 Under the influence of Russell and Burch (1959), the 
3Rs policy has been adopted by nearly all regulatory agencies 
.. 
as a guiding policy. For an account of Replacement, 
Refinement, and Reduction and the limitations of searches 
for alternatives, see, for example, Orlans, 1993, chapters 5-6. 
22 On assessing goals, see Dresser (1989a and b) for a 
review of the problems. 
23 The 1990Australian Code ofPractice for the Care and 
Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes requires that 
"Experiments using animals may be performed only after a 
decision has been made that they are justified, weighing the 
scientific or educational value of the experiment against the 
potential effects on the welfare of the animal." See, for 
example, ACCARTNews, 1991,4,1: 1. 
24 See Dresser, 1989b, and Prentice et al., 1990, 1991, 
and 1992. 
25 See, for example, Loew, 1987. 
26 See Rollin (1989) on this point and the general debate 
on what animals can be aware of. The issue of what constitutes 
animal well-being overlaps with the issue of what moral status, 
if any, animals are entitled to. Beauchamp (1992) addresses 
some of these issues by examining the alleged relationships 
between cognitive abilities and moral considerability and poses 
some interesting problems that cognitivists must address. 
27 Compare the cost of supporting incompetents or 
prisoners, or people on life support systems, or the elderly in 
nursing homes. 
28 I have tried elsewhere to give this position more 
substance. See Haynes, 1991. 
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